Plan XVII

April 1913

German-French animosity is smoldering, largely the result of the outcome of the Franco-Prussian war.  French patriotism is outraged that the Prussians had triumphed over them and is now the dominant power on the continent.  In Germany the conventional wisdom believes that it has not received the just spoils of that war.  On both sides of the border, military minds are making plans.

The German plan for the next war was already in place in 1905, the Schlieffen plan, which posited a swift attack on France through neutral Belgium.  Of course, the planned movement through a neutral country is top secret and is known only at the highest levels of the German government and military.  The Germans, always contemplating with horror their possible encirclement, are counting on a swift defeat over France so they can turn their full attention to the behemoth in the East, the Russian Empire.

In French military circles, a new philosophical approach to war is being bruited, the principle of pre-eminence of offensive action.  (It's counterpoint on the German side of the border would one day be known as blitzkreig.)  The idea is to concentrate force where it can most quickly overwhelm and destroy the invading armies and turn them back.  It is a doctrine that is based on the somewhat metaphysical concept of Élan vital or the will to victory.

There are military strategists in France (General Victor Michel) who believe the correct approach is to fortify and prepare a defense along the northern border with Belgium  There is even substantial military intelligence that indicates the German plan but it is ignored, being at odds with prevailing opinion. But, the voices advocating a strong defensive posture are drowned out by the the voices of aggression (Foch who was instrumental in devising French military strategy as director of the military academy and Joffre) who devise Plan XVII, implemented beginning this month.  Along with it, a change to the French term of  service for conscripts to three years is instituted, resulting in a very different disposition of  French armed forces.